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Changing Meanings of “German”
in Habsburg Central Europe
◆

Pieter M. Judson

◆

How might we usefully examine the relations between German and non-Germancommunities in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century without imposing a
modern nation-centered perspective on those relations? How did German communities or individuals diﬀerentiate themselves from their non-German neighbors, if
at all? More importantly, how did popular understandings of what it meant to be a
German (or German-speaking) change during the nineteenth century? And how did
such ideas about national identity become the basis for a cultural and social politics
of separation within and among communities in many parts of Eastern Europe? This
essay tries to suggest some useful ways of thinking about German-speakers, their
changing conceptions of themselves and of their non-German-speaking neighbors
in the broad geographic region known as East Central Europe during the long nineteenth century (1789–1914), using examples drawn primarily from the Habsburg
Monarchy. In particular the essay contrasts conceptual changes about identity among
nationalists to the ongoing realities of daily life in multilingual regions, demonstrating unevenness in the development of a consistent, coherent, and popular German
national identity. By the end of the nineteenth century German nationalist media,
politicians and organizations all framed daily life in the region in terms of ongoing
battles among nations. They attributed local incidents of violence to nationalist animosities and portrayed the local world in terms of nationalist conﬂict. Yet despite
their best eﬀorts the nation remained an object of indiﬀerence, ambivalence, and only
occasional interest among most inhabitants of East Central Europe.
During the nineteenth century, ideas about national identity ﬁrst became politicized and popularized among large, socially diverse populations.1 This process was
anything but predictable or linear in nature, nor did it take place in a consistent or
similar manner across the region. Despite the claims of nationalists to the contrary,
the process did not reﬂect deeper transhistorical features somehow embedded in the
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region or in the peoples who have inhabited it. The particular character of local society
produced particular local beliefs about national identity, and these often varied widely
within broadly deﬁned national communities. Considering oneself to be a German
in one part of Eastern Europe, for example, might involve a completely diﬀerent set
of shared or imagined qualities than it did in another part of Eastern Europe.
For social scientists, journalists, and politicians, the challenge of deﬁning who
was considered a German national and what political meanings that label conveyed
appeared to be solved only by the end of the First World War. Post-1918 European
governments increasingly categorized their populations according to particular ethnic
attributes, often as a means to determine which groups should enjoy the full rights of
citizenship. State policies that linked the full exercise of citizenship rights to membership in a national community helped to popularize national identities among their
own populations even more. By the mid-twentieth century, radical policies of ethnic
cleansing, discrimination against linguistic or religious minorities, and wholesale
expulsions, not to mention genocide, had indelibly imprinted formerly abstract categories on the experiences, relationships, and self-understandings of many Europeans,
including the inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe.
Since our period largely predates the twentieth-century introduction of identity
cards, oﬃcial systems of national ascription or ethnic attribution, it is far more difﬁcult to determine which people considered themselves to be German or German
national in the nineteenth century and what exactly they meant by that label.2 On the
other hand, those practices of ethnic or national attribution that underlay twentiethcentury government policies certainly developed from ways of thinking about large
populations that had originated in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such
ways of thinking about populations—in terms of ethnically or linguistically deﬁned
nations—in turn originated both at the level of state policy and at the level of popular
social movements. They resulted both from state centralization initiatives—often not
immediately concerned with determining national belonging—and in many regions
from a rise of popular participation in local, regional, and state politics. In this essay I
try to suggest how these varied factors taken together produced new understandings
of identity, often making those identities into the basis of new forms of politics. After
an introductory discussion I propose to analyze debates about the meaning of nation
from the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, drawn from two particular moments: the revolutions of 1848 and the end of the nineteenth century, when politics
became both nationalized and popular in character.
Nation itself was a relatively recent form of popular self-identiﬁcation in the nineteenth-century world. The term “nation” meant many things in 1789, but few of these
approached the mass-oriented ethnic, linguistic, religious, or territorial understandings of the term that had become standard by 1914. Some early-nineteenth-century
deﬁnitions of nations, such as the Magyar or Polish, referred quite speciﬁcally to the
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traditional privileges enjoyed by corporately deﬁned social groups within a polity.
In cases such as these “the nation” referred to the gentry and aristocracy of a given
state or province. Yet the restless century of industrialization, urbanization, increased
communication, consumption, and movement in Europe produced a considerable
expansion of the literate public, an explosion of popular media, and the rapid growth
of mass politics in the region. These developments both informed and transformed
the very meanings of terms like “Magyar,” “Polish,” and “German,” as such terms
came to apply to entire populations rather than to speciﬁc social groups. Thus the
nineteenth-century context of growing mass political involvement helped to produce
the ambition both among nationalist activists and some regimes to realize the nation
in every individual.3
In many parts of Europe imperial regimes had often relied on corporate-based
alliances with local elites to impose their rule more eﬀectively among their diverse
territories, as, for example, with the Russian government’s relationship to Baltic German-speaking communities. During the nineteenth century, however, many regimes
turned increasingly to the use of linguistic, religious, or national categories as a way to
impose more centralized and consistent forms of administrative rule over local populations. For the centralizing regime, often absolute in its pretensions, the quality of rule,
so to speak, had to be consistent and universal, no matter the type of subject to which
it was applied. Liberal theory too demanded a legal equality and equivalent treatment
among all subjects of a ruler. Both of these developments could well make use of the
more universal idea of nation, or even of religion or cultural tradition, as a means of
reforging links between government and local society. Clearly none of these newer
concepts (nation, religion, culture) was actually universal in scope when applied to real
situations. Nor did most regimes take easily to visions of community that diﬀered so
radically from earlier understandings of the bases for community or society.
When an imperial government that had largely relied on alliances with local
elites began instead to diﬀerentiate peoples by means of language use or religion, the
change wreaked havoc on previous social alliances, threatening as it did the traditional
shape of local social relations. In reaction to such policies, a local elite social group
(like those Baltic German-speakers) often redeﬁned its own traditional social status
more consciously in terms of linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions rather than
according to the privileged functions it had played within the empire. Local social
groups could respond both defensively and opportunistically to the ideological and
political spaces created when regimes invoked nationalist, cultural, or religious deﬁnitions of community. In the Prussian partition of Poland, for example, the government
eventually came to use the issue of popular national identity as part of a larger strategy
to undermine the power of traditional elites over the local economy. Constructing a
greater sense of loyalty to their rulers based on language use or religious practice among
the lowest classes, like the transfer of property from its former owners, appeared to
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enhance the centralizing power of the imperial state. But such a strategy carried with
it serious long-term risks linked to the mobilization of a mass base as well. In the
Prussian case, policies of Germanization in the late nineteenth century only helped
to produce a new, mass-based sense of Polish identity that spread well beyond the
traditional members of the Polish nation (the gentry) to peasants, artisans, and workers. This created a much broader and more socially uniﬁed basis for opposition to the
regime.4 At the same time, the Prussian regime’s focus on policies of Germanization
lent ammunition to its German nationalist critics, who contended that only the most
extreme policies could eﬀectively achieve the government’s goals.
In the new German Empire after 1871, radical activists’ own attempts to produce
a stronger public appreciation for the importance of Germanness “from below” gained
some reluctant support from local, state, and federal government agencies, particularly
in multilingual regions. The Kulturkampf in its popular dimensions also contributed
to the popularization of German nationalist eﬀorts, since Polish nationalism in Prussia rested increasingly on identiﬁcation with the local practice of Catholicism. Yet in
Germany oﬃcial government eﬀorts to Germanize non-German-speaking peoples
remained mitigated by practical concerns of state that outweighed the single-minded
engagement of nationalist activists. Nationalist activists consistently demanded more
radical policies of Germanization in the East precisely because they rarely gained the
degree of ﬁnancial or ideological support from the government for which they had
hoped.5 In this case we can see that the popular discourses used to debate issues of
nationalization and the radical proposals that became policy in the twentieth century
did not dominate government policy in the nineteenth century. If the origins of
extreme policies of nationalist citizenship can be seen in the nineteenth century, the
particular ways in which they became policy in the twentieth century were certainly
not inevitable or even foreseeable.
In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, where political centralization also
gradually replaced traditional reliance on local elites, state policy before 1848 was
not deﬁned in modern ethnic or national terms. As we shall see, however, linguistic
policy linked to administrative centralization did help to produce the rise of mass
national identities.
The popularization of German nationalist identities and politics in the Habsburg
Monarchy in the nineteenth century proceeded from several complex sources.
However, even as we examine processes of nationalization, we also need to consider
a diﬀerent and perhaps more vexing question. What, after all, did the term “German” as a signiﬁer of identity mean to people in communities throughout Central
and Eastern Europe? Who could be considered a German, and on what basis? By
the end of the nineteenth century was there a common understanding among selfproclaimed Germans about what constituted their unique identity and who might
share in it? When we invoke the term “German” or “German nationalist,” we are
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not using terms whose meanings are self-evident to observers or consistently deﬁned throughout the region. Even to those who may have identiﬁed themselves as
“Germans” in the nineteenth century, whether in the Habsburg Monarchy or in the
eastern border regions of Prussia, the meanings of the term were hardly transparent,
self-explanatory or uncontroversial. For today’s reader, the term conveys a deceptively
(easy) empirical sense of familiarity. We presume that Germans are easily recognizable
when they appear in the historical record, and we know that they were present in
several regions of nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the empirical
conﬁdence we feel in the object of our research tends to dissolve upon closer inspection
of the nineteenth-century individuals and communities who constitute the objects
of our study. When the historical record yields examples of literate individuals who
self-consciously referred to themselves as members of a larger German community or
nation, these individuals usually deﬁned their Germanness in ways that neither we nor
self-deﬁned Germans from other regions would necessarily ﬁnd familiar. Germanness
as a quality often signiﬁed a system of social and cultural values that helped people
to mark their particular place in local society. The particularities of local conditions
therefore often shaped local understandings of the term “German.” The notion that
Germans constituted a recognizable and well-deﬁned group of people who shared a
common sense of self-identiﬁcation throughout Central and Eastern Europe derives
largely from the eﬀorts of nineteenth-century nationalist activists themselves who
sought to create an interregional and uniﬁed German nation.
At the outset of the nineteenth century the term “German” would have been
understood very diﬀerently in particular regions and at diﬀerent levels of society. At
one level the rise of a German literary culture in the eighteenth century spoke to a
growing, socially relatively homogenous reading public across Central and Eastern
Europe. At another level some activists passionately believed that the inhabitants of
the various German states constituted a nation that could potentially form its own
uniﬁed state to rival France or England. For others, as with Lutherans in northern
Hungary or Galicia, being German meant professing a particular religious tradition
in a region where most people practiced a diﬀerent religion. Being German in Tyrol
meant practicing a particularly orthodox form of Catholicism, while in Styria it often
implied a skepticism toward the Catholic hierarchy.6 Inhabitants of other regions
called themselves Germans because education in and knowledge of German culture
constituted a local form of cultural capital that oﬀered social status and mobility
to those who adopted it. As a form of identity that was often situationally deﬁned,
when it was considered at all, Germanness rarely referred to qualities or interests that
transcended a local perspective. This is especially evident from the nature of the task
that faced German nationalist activists in both the German Empire and the Habsburg
Monarchy: to convince Germans in individual localities to see themselves in terms
of their commonalties with a larger interregional nation.
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If those who saw themselves as Germans nevertheless used the term in diverse
ways to express very diﬀerent kinds of identities, should we treat them as constituting a single group? If, for example, people who could speak or read German did not
think of themselves as Germans, can we usefully refer to them as Germans? We must
recall that in the nineteenth century Germans as a group existed only as an analytic
tool for our purposes and not as a substantial reality. 7 This caveat also extends to
those forms of diﬀerence that we presume must have constituted sources of diﬀerence in identity for nineteenth-century individuals. To imagine that certain social or
cultural diﬀerences in the past inevitably produced the national diﬀerences we see in
the present is to impose a national teleology on the evidence. If nations and national
identities are invented, they do not necessarily need to be organized around some
transhistorical local form of diﬀerence, as the work of several historians of the region
remind us.8 In fact, the search for transhistorical diﬀerences (as a key to explaining later
ethnic or national conﬂict) is an ahistoric undertaking that repeats the claims made
by nineteenth-century “national awakeners.” They, after all, believed that awareness
of diﬀerences needed only to be aroused among the broader population to produce
inevitable forms of national consciousness. In fact, it is the processes outlined earlier,
the interactions between state policy and local initiative that gave larger social meaning to local forms of diﬀerence like language use.
If Germans in the nineteenth century did not constitute a self-consciously
bounded group of people, plenty of activists, social scientists, philosophers, and historians, among others, nevertheless worked hard to realize the goal of creating such
a group. As the public sphere of political, economic, social and cultural engagement
pushed beyond the walls of rural small towns in the nineteenth century, nationalist
activists increasingly worked to forge popular group loyalties to a greater German
nation that would be shared by an interregional public. Still, as scholarship on the
nineteenth century concept of Heimat reminds us, when people called themselves (or
others) Germans during the nineteenth century, they often used the term to refer to
a set of shared qualities that remained deﬁned by local circumstances and traditions.
They did not necessarily think of themselves as part of an interregional culture.9
One avenue of approach to investigating the Germans in nineteenth-century
Central and Eastern Europe is to analyze the changing popular meanings of the terms
“German” and “Germans” as they were used at all levels of public life during the
nineteenth century. In the next two sections of this essay I look at speciﬁc approaches
to this question, one from 1848 and the other from the late nineteenth century in
Habsburg Austria. Both of these historical moments witnessed renewed public debate
over the meanings of “the Germans” and “Germanness,” and a few examples will
suﬃce to show both the early diversity of meaning of the terms, and also the ways
the use of the terms and their meanings changed over ﬁfty years.
The conﬂicts over the meanings of a German nation in 1848 engaged a limited
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stratum of society. The eﬀorts of this stratum built in part on an appropriation of
Habsburg state modernization processes that were rooted in moral, intellectual, and
social reform visions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As Arnold Suppan points out in his essay, the eighteenth-century reform eﬀorts of Maria Theresa
and particularly Joseph II produced policies that treated the German language as the
new lingua franca (to replace Latin) of the Habsburgs’ culturally diverse holdings.
The reformers’ goals—to increase the coherence of administration, the productivity, loyalty, and moral capacities of their subjects through increased educational and
economic opportunities—all produced policies favorable to German language use at
every level of society, although not necessarily unfavorable to the use of other local
languages as well.10
It is not diﬃcult to see how early German nationalists conﬂated the reformers’
focus on the utility of the German language with the alleged cultural and later the
national qualities of those who used this language. German nationalists adopted this
sense of cultural leadership in part as a political response to the claims of the Magyar,
Polish, and later Czech nationalists who opposed Habsburg centralization and saw
their interests best reﬂected in decentralized structures. The functional importance
of the German language to the centralized empire became the foundation for several
arguments promoting the political interests of German-speakers as such. But one
should be wary of confusing the terms “German-speaker” with “German,” since
many Magyar and Czech nationalists in the early nineteenth century, for example,
spoke German ﬂuently, and did not deﬁne their nationalist loyalties in terms of their
linguistic competence.11 Furthermore, since the term “nation” had traditionally referred to a political corporation and not a linguistically deﬁned community, it is not
surprising to hear speakers of one language around 1800 declaring their loyalty to
a nation represented by a diﬀerent language. We have only to think of those urban
German-speakers in the Prussian partition of Poland who proclaimed their loyalty
to Poland against their region’s absorption by Prussia.12 Examples such as this also
remind us that throughout the nineteenth century, diﬀerences in religious, regional,
or class identiﬁcation often determined social loyalties far more powerfully than differences in language use.
What range of cultural qualities did the term “German” connote in a local social
context by 1848? Did it also refer somehow to an interregional community of Germans? The sudden profusion of public political debate unleashed by the revolution
sharply conveyed diverse contemporary meanings of concepts like nation, Germans,
Germanness, and Germany in the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. Almost
overnight, these concepts became an integral part of the popular rhetoric used to
demand political, economic, and social reform in ways that had been impossible before
the revolution terminated the Vormärz censorship regime. In 1848, most civically
engaged people in Austria appear to have agreed that nationhood was inextricably
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linked to the pressing issues of personal, community, political and social freedom.
Most revolutionaries conceded that without the guarantee of such liberal freedoms,
national consciousness could not be spread and national greatness certainly could
not be attained. Many historians of 1848, however, tended to present liberalism and
national rights as alternatives to each other, even if allegedly naïve political actors at
the time did not understand the inevitability of this dichotomy. According to this
version of events, individuals and parties eventually had to choose between their liberal
and their national commitments.13 The 1848ers, however, did not understand the
issues in quite such binary terms. Mid-nineteenth century activists more often than
not conceived national development and political freedoms as mutually constitutive
of each other. One could not exist without the other; these were not separate or
separable issues. Most bourgeois nationalists (Czech, German, Slovene) believed that
the development of their nation depended on the moral progress of their people, and
such progress—to be accomplished above all through civic education—could not
be guaranteed without the beneﬁt of basic civil rights and the experience of political
participation.
When the Viennese German nationalist newspaper Schwarz-Roth-Gold complained about peasant apathy to the nation in August 1848, it did so in terms that
linked national identity inextricably to progressive political and moral values. “Traditional education made people stupid. The majority of Austrian peasants does not even
know that there is a Germany and that it is their fatherland! . . . Traditional forms
of education did not want to . . . provide our children with the example of the free
men of their national past, out of fear that it would teach them [to think] independently.”14 It was the very quality of freedom that characterized everything having to
do with nation, and this link of liberal ideas to national identity forged a concept of
nation far diﬀerent from the concepts we encounter around 1900. This may help us
to understand why the statutes of several German nationalist organizations in 1848,
for example, made membership available to “any Austrian citizen without regard to
religion, nationality, or estate.”15 How could membership in a German nationalist
organization be open to individuals of “any nationality?” Clearly the activists who
formulated these statutes did not wish to limit membership in a German nation to
those who were German-speakers or who felt themselves to be German, but rather
opened their community to those who shared their cultural values and political
commitment.
If political activists understood a German national community as one that was
open to all who partook of their idealism, then the second point to understand about
1848 is how very few people actually shared a sense of national consciousness. Not
only did very few peasants express a sense of national belonging, as the quotation
above demonstrates, but those who did see themselves as part of a nation often deﬁned
that nation in highly parochial terms. The prominence of nation in public discussions
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should not blind us to the deeply local ways in which it was conceived and understood. Rather than speak of the Germans in East Central Europe, when it comes to
1848 we can perhaps speak of those Tyrolers, Upper Austrians, Styrians, Bohemians,
or Moravians who also considered themselves to be German. Activists who sought
to spread national enlightenment to the peasantry in 1848 usually formulated their
appeals in terms of highly localized interests. This constituted a strategic choice, but
it also reﬂected the beliefs and experiences of the nationalists themselves. In very few
places (Vienna, Graz) did discussions of nation transcend local understandings to
incorporate broader political and social visions. When, for example, the young Karl
Stremayr, a law student at the University of Graz, ran for election to the Frankfurt
Parliament, a body whose task after all was the construction of a German nation-state,
his speech to local peasant voters hardly mentioned Germany. Instead, he focused
on the need to end the feudal economic system and the absolutist regime, and on
his loyalty to the emperor.16
This situational understanding of nation also permeated discussions among
activists who held more radical nationalist positions in towns where nationalist conﬂict between diﬀerent groups had broken out. The Slovene historian Peter Vodopivec
recounts one such example of local tradition shaping nationalist positions in southern
Styria, where German-speakers and Slovene-speakers often lived in close proximity.
In 1848, Slovene nationalists in Ljubljana/Laibach (in neighboring Krain province)
demanded the creation of a new province that would unite all Slovenes in the monarchy. Several Slovene nationalists in Styria, however, opposed the division of their
traditional province along national lines. Instead of creating a Slovene province with
its own diet, the Styrian Slovenes promoted greater national reconciliation and equality among nations within Styria. A poem dating from 1848 and cited by Vodopivec
captures a very diﬀerent kind of nationalist agenda and includes the following lines
(written alternately in Slovene and German):
How happy are we brothers,
in beautiful Styria,
we need not fear any ill,
our unity makes us strong,
the knowledge of both languages,
this promotes commerce,
to go our separate ways,
would harm us all.17
German-speaking deputies to the Styrian diet charged with creating a new provincial constitution reacted bitterly when Slovene nationalists displayed their Slavic
red-white-and-blue colors publicly or founded a Slovene nationalist association in
Graz, seeing such actions as public challenges to German and liberal ideals.18 On
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the other hand, the German-speaking deputies in Graz treated Slovene speakers (as
opposed to Slovene nationalists) as trustworthy political allies, agreeing to publish
Slovene language translations of the diet’s proceedings in local German newspapers
in order to make the legislative session more accessible. “Many of the Slovenes who
read the Graz papers are very intelligent people,” noted one German liberal deputy
to the diet, and appending the translations would “give them more trust in us.”19
These examples suggest that at mid-century, local diﬀerences in language use did
not deﬁne community relations and identities as fully as later nationalists believed they
should. In 1848 local relations and familiarity still appear to have counted far more
than any abstract interregional sense of nation. At the same time, if local diﬀerences
in language use did not convey incommensurable diﬀerences, and bilingualism often
appeared to be the norm, then local examples of intermarriage and social interaction
between users of diﬀerent languages would not have seemed remarkable either. For
this reason too, deﬁnitions of Germanness remained open and vague, and liberal
in their relations to other nations. Again, from the pages of Schwarz-Roth-Gold,
one writer in July 1848 underlined this openness, claiming that membership in the
nation “is based not simply on the soil of birth or language of culture, but rather
on . . . nobility of action and the worthiness of conviction.” Those who sought out
education for themselves and their children and demonstrated their commitment to
humanistic values could indeed become German. In fact, the 1848ers believed that
this same set of moral qualities that deﬁned their nation would enable it successfully
to regulate relations among all the other nations within the Austrian Empire. “We
want a German Austria . . . a powerful leader for all our brother nationalities, not
through [coercive] power . . . but rather through the voluntary respect that we earn
when we deal in freedom and humanity.”20
Yet even as German nationalists conceived their nation in open and liberal
terms, they, and their counterparts in other movements, faced serious political issues
that appear to us to have almost guaranteed the development of mutual antagonism
among movements. The Herculean task of reconstituting political and social order on
a new basis, as manifested in the eﬀorts of the Frankfurt and Vienna (later Kremsier)
parliaments, the short-lived Slav congress, the town councils and provincial diets, all
but guaranteed that practical issues of language use would create a serious political
bone of contention. German nationalists had trouble understanding the protests of
those who sought to undo the earlier attempts to make German a lingua franca for
the empire. It is perhaps a testimony to the narrow social basis of nationalist activists,
men who had much more in common than they cared to admit, that they maintained
a common vision of liberal freedoms in the Kremsier draft and refused to allow their
eﬀorts to be derailed by nationalist conﬂict. It was precisely the issue of language use
in government and administration that created a space for the political activism that
fundamentally divided nationalists by the late nineteenth century.
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In the ﬁfty years following the revolutions of 1848, far more people in the Austrian
Empire became actively involved in a public sphere whose limits grew well beyond
the boundaries of village or region. Nineteenth-century governments too, continued
on the path of centralized state building that had been initiated by their reforming
predecessors of the eighteenth century. In the aftermath of the revolution the Habsburg
regime had even revived its eﬀorts to impose greater coherence on regional and local administration through expanded use of German in the bureaucracy. This new
insistence on German as the language of governance in the 1850s provoked eﬀective
opposition in Hungary. Government centralization in Austria, however, went well
beyond language use in the civil service to encompass education reform, development
of a transportation and communications infrastructure for the entire empire, and
targeted investment to promote industrialization.
Constitutional reform in the 1860s loosened censorship, expanded public
education and associational life signiﬁcantly, and increased popular participation in
politics. The expansion of communications and transportation infrastructures often
recast political questions in interregional as opposed to local terms. Through the
eﬀorts of local associations, local media and political parties, more and more Austrians joined public life in some capacity or other. With the Compromise of 1867,
the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy gradually adopted nationalizing policies
typical of nation-states like France, Germany, or Italy. The empire that formed the
Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, however, remained oﬃcially anational (later
multinational). This state experienced a steady rise in mass political participation,
culminating with the implementation of universal manhood suﬀrage for parliamentary elections in 1907.
In Austrian society, attempts to categorize and mobilize people in ethnic or
national terms emerged from popular nationalist political initiatives after 1848 and
not directly from the oﬃces of government agencies. Nevertheless, the ongoing modernizing eﬀorts of the state played a critical, if unwitting, role in the nationalization
of Austrian society in the late nineteenth century. As nationalist political movements
competed within the framework of the new constitutional system to increase their
electoral constituencies in an age of growing mass-based politics, they sought to
make the idea of national identity relevant to every aspect of life. They succeeded at
least in nationalizing political life by demanding the application of constitutional
guarantees of linguistic equality to an ever-expanding set of institutions. From educational to judicial institutions, from administrative to commercial practices, no
possible corner of public life remained immune to the demands of nationalists. The
late-nineteenth-century infusion of nationalist content into public life ranged from
the provision of welfare beneﬁts or access to education at all levels to local forms of
economic competition and even to patterns of consumption.
To realize this nationalization of public life as fully as possible, however, each
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group had to deﬁne a set of shared qualities that would help newly politicized
Austrians to understand to which nation they belonged and why. Additionally, the
dynamic of nationalist political competition within Austria after 1867 caused the
leaders of each group regularly to insist that its needs were incommensurable with
those of competing nations and that a gulf of enormous proportions separated the
members of one nation from another. Such claims of diﬀerences among populations
were made vigorously and often, in part because national belonging continued to
mean very little to most nineteenth-century Austrians as they went about their daily
routines. And while ordinary Austrians may have reacted with interest or indiﬀerence
to claims about the importance of national loyalties, nationalist activists continued
to develop and reﬁne their claims about national diﬀerences, how they manifested
themselves in daily life, and how they could be measured scientiﬁcally.
By 1900 both ideas about nation and the numbers of people who felt allegiance
to nations had changed dramatically throughout East Central Europe. The character
of ideas about Germanness changed too, in part because of the growing popularization of politics, in part because of the 1867 Compromise, which had recognized
the rights of the Hungarian nation, and in part because of the activism of other
nationalist groups in the empire, particularly the Czech nationalists. The role of the
German language and culture as a broadly unifying factor in Austrian public life
declined considerably as Slav nationalists agitated successfully in the legislatures and
the courts for the use of their languages in schools, universities, the courts, and the
civil service. German might remain the inner, interregional language of the imperial
bureaucracy and of the military, but its advantages as a universal lingua franca in the
region had diminished.
Many German nationalists clung uneasily to the traditional claim of German
language and culture as somehow more culturally advanced and therefore more valuable than the other languages in public use in the monarchy. With the establishment
of Polish and Czech universities at L’viv/Lwów/Lemberg and Prague, with Italian
nationalist demands for an Italian-language law faculty and Slovene demands for a
university in Ljubljana, the position of German as the undisputed vehicle of culture,
progress, and modernity was less self-evident. As a result, German nationalist assertions of their nation’s Kulturträger status in East Central Europe became increasingly
strident. As German nationalists became more defensive about the position of their
language and culture in the monarchy, they began to adopt new arguments to justify
their leading position. They did not abandon arguments about the universality of
their nation, and except for the anti-Semites among them, they continued to welcome
anyone into its ranks. Yet at the same time, they articulated some new arguments that
located speciﬁc spaces as German and that stressed the incommensurable diﬀerences
that separated theirs from other cultures. Speakers of other languages, especially in the
cities, seemed less and less likely to choose to become German for the sake of social
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mobility, now that they had other options available to them in other languages.21
Consequently, the German nationalist community became more inward-looking and
exclusive in its rhetoric. The greater German nationalist focus on national ownership
of territory and on the fundamental diﬀerences that allegedly separated nations also
derived from a growing appreciation of the importance of numbers, rather than of
“quality” or cultural status, in inﬂuencing local and imperial politics. Elections had
to be won if control by one nationalist group or another was to be exercised eﬀectively. Although a curial system that favored wealthier and better-educated citizens
dominated local municipal and regional elections, activists nevertheless sought to
mobilize every possible voter in every curia for their purposes.22
After 1848, many government policies of modernization depended on initiatives in the social sciences that sought to organize and map populations according to
their linguistic and religious character, for the purpose of applying social policy more
eﬀectively.23 Categorization of local populations according to language use in the imperial census, for example, became valuable tools for the development of local school
and, later, welfare policies after the passage of the 1867 constitution in Austria. Since
the constitution had promised equal treatment to the speakers of Austria’s diﬀerent
languages, this required setting up schools in native languages wherever possible.24
Over time, the implementation of this guarantee and its application to other areas
of public life (courts, civil service) required increased statistical knowledge about the
linguistic make-up of local populations.
In the 1870s, government statisticians developed a census apparatus that would
question Austrians, among other things, about their language of everyday use.25 The
imperial government had no wish to promote nationalist agitation or the importance
of national identity, however indirectly, through the census. Yet its attempt at linguistic categorization for limited policy purposes produced several unintended side
eﬀects, including new opportunities for nationalist politicians. Statistical studies
like the decennial census did not automatically produce nations through a kind of
Foucauldian eﬀect, but they certainly did produce new opportunities for nationbuilding, which creative nationalist politicians readily exploited. In early debates
over the particular form of the census, nationalists had complained vigorously that it
asked respondents for their language of daily use instead of for their mother tongue
or their nationality. The nationalists’ failure to impose national categories on the
census, however, did not daunt activists in the least. They simply used other tools at
their disposal—press, political agitation, mass meetings—to link language usage in
the census to broader, newly invented mass nationalist identities. The nationalists
appropriated census categories like “language of daily use” in order to mobilize people
on the basis of common qualities. Already in the 1880s, following the ﬁrst Austrian
census, activists claimed that all those who had listed a particular language on the
census form belonged in fact to that nation. This claim, and the counter-claims it
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provoked, produced powerful eﬀects in Austrian public life. By 1910 many more
people believed the language question referred to their nationality—a ﬁxed personal
identity—rather than to the function of language in their locality. Nationalist activists
even turned to the courts to challenge the census results for particular localities where
they believed the national enemy had somehow manipulated the outcome.26
If nationalists complained that the census did not explicitly ask for the national
allegiance of its respondents, historians might complain that it made no allowance
for the many people who used more than one language in families, businesses, or
daily social lives, to report that critical fact. We have no way of knowing whether
any of these respondents in fact spoke the language of another nation as well. We
historians have also validated nationalist claims about the census, however inadvertently, by reading it ourselves as if it somehow revealed national self-identiﬁcation
among the Austrian population. Histories of the Habsburg Monarchy or East Central
Europe invariably include maps depicting the languages that a majority of people
reported in a particular region. Almost always these maps identify their subjects as
“the Czechs,” “the Germans,” or “the Slovenes,” for example, rather than as “Czechspeakers,” “German-speakers,” or “Slovene-speakers.”27 This slippage on the printed
page—from the individual who reported a single language of daily use in the census
to the presumption of national identity—transforms all people into members of nations, whether they felt that way or not. From there it is a small step to territorialize
those nations by assigning to them the geographic regions where they appear to have
constituted a majority.
Instead of accepting nationalist claims that associated language use on the
census with a declaration of national identity, historians might more fruitfully ask
what factors induced some respondents to report one language in a given year instead of another language. How might we explain the choices of those individuals,
families, and communities who self-consciously practiced a form of bilingualism,
marrying their German language skills to Czech, Slovene, Polish, or Hungarian (or
marrying their Czech skills to an acquired knowledge of German)? In some regions
we know that the same people reported diﬀerent languages of daily usage in different decennial censuses.28 What situations caused them to report one language
one year and a diﬀerent language ten years later? Considering these questions in a
nineteenth-century context might help us to avoid presuming that such people had
already developed a single and consistent sense of national identity. It would also
encourage us to follow Rogers Brubaker’s productive suggestion that we think of
individual national professions of identity—professions of nationness—as an occasion or as an event rather than as an ongoing process or and unchanging, internalized truth.29 Finally, keeping these questions in mind would help us literally to see
things diﬀerently when we examine the abstract depictions of social scientists that
map language use onto territory.
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If we consider the information that these abstracted maps, graphs, and charts
fail to convey to us (bilingualism, situational reporting of linguistic usage), we can
see one reason why it is so diﬃcult to speak of Germans, German communities, or
a German nation in nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe. Other kinds
of choices made by individuals, families, and communities also undercut the clear
assertion of national identity proclaimed for them by contemporary nationalist activists. Why, for example, did some parents in multilingual regions choose to rear and
school their children in more than one language? Nationalist activists tried to square
their version of reality with the social behaviors they encountered by denouncing
such people as “amphibians,” “national hermaphrodites,” and as psychologically
deformed opportunists who would sell themselves and their children to the highest
national bidder. Or they depicted such people as the unfortunate pawns of oppressive employers and landlords who forced them to adopt a diﬀerent language from
their authentic one in order to save their job or their apartment. 30 By speaking and
writing in these terms, nationalists sought to normalize the concept that everyone
indeed had one authentic national identity. To us, however, the example of people
who did not easily ﬁt into a nationalist schema points to the fundamental diﬃculty of
presuming that language use in the nineteenth century implied a particular national
community identity.
Although more people clearly saw themselves as Germans, as part of a larger German nation by 1900, the signiﬁcance of that choice and the meanings with which they
imbued this choice also remained diverse and often contradictory. The generally swift
rise of popular literacy and newspapers throughout the empire meant that people far
away from each other received their news from sources that presented it in a uniform
context. Far more people who adopted a national identity now shared a comparable
sense of the meaning of their Germanness and who belonged to their community, than
earlier in the century. Nevertheless, regional loyalties remained powerful when it came
to those deﬁnitions, and activists often scrambled to paper over several conﬂicts about
the character of the German community that had emerged by 1900. Two particularly
vexing questions that prevented the formation of an ideologically uniﬁed German
nationalist movement involved the role of Jews and the Catholic Church within that
movement. Several organizations and parties deﬁned their German identity in terms
of racial, religious, or economic anti-Semitism. Several, including the largest among
them, remained open to Jewish membership and to a non-racial deﬁnition of the German community. Many German nationalists in a region like the Tyrol (like Christian
Socials in Lower and Upper Austria) continued to deﬁne their community identity in
terms of loyalty to the Catholic Church, whereas German nationalist organizations and
parties elsewhere saw the Church as their nation’s enemy. When these latter organizations attempted to unify their eﬀorts, as with the ﬁrst Congress of German Nationalist
Defense Organizations in 1908, for example, they could not achieve the hoped-for
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unity, precisely due to the powerful disagreements about these issues, particularly the
role of Jews.31 While it is true that far more Austrians saw themselves as belonging to
a German nation in 1900 than had been the case in 1848, they did not agree at all on
the character or meaning of this nation.
This essay has attempted to demonstrate that terms like “German” or “nation” carried far more diﬀuse and locally based meanings for diverse nineteenth-century
populations than they did to Germans at various points in the twentieth century.
The study of context, of historical contingency, and of individual circumstance is key
to determining what individuals and communities adopted what national identities
over time. So is the idea of nation-ness as event rather than identity. When and in
what kinds of situations in the nineteenth century did people tend to see themselves
as national? In what kinds of situations were they indiﬀerent or ambivalent about the
idea of belonging to a nation? Individuals, families, or even communities may have
adopted national identities at certain moments, but that did not prevent some of them
from adopting diﬀerent identities at other moments, or from expressing complete
indiﬀerence to those identities at yet other moments. Even those who did identify
themselves consistently as “Germans” throughout this period would not necessarily
have understood themselves as members of a larger interregional German community,
one that formed an interconnected, uniﬁed cultural and social whole. Their sense
of their Germanness may have derived from their particular religious practice, their
local social position, or their degree of education. In the context of speciﬁc regional
and local identities there may indeed have been plenty of self-described Germans to
be found, but little sense of a larger connection among such groups of individuals.
Imposing the common term “Germans” on these diverse populations risks compromising the accuracy of our representations of people in the past by ﬂattening out their
considerable diﬀerences to ﬁt them into a broad modern category.32
It is also clear, however, that the requirements of modernizing states and the
eﬀorts of developing social sciences worked together, however unintentionally, to
promote the categorization of populations in terms of language use, religious practice,
and eventually according to the abstract concept of nation. While state policies did
not alone create nations in the nineteenth century, they often created the available
political and social spaces where local or regional activists could articulate particular
interests. Even states like Austria, whose policy opposed the recognition of national
interests, nevertheless helped to produce the spread of nationalism through promises
of linguistic and religious equality. The most egregious example of Austrian state policy
that unintentionally encouraged the process of nationalization of populations was
undoubtedly the Moravian Compromise of 1905. Undertaken in order to diminish
the harmful eﬀects of political nationalism on public life, the compromise created
separate Czech and German electoral lists and school systems. The new law required,
however, that all Moravians register themselves and their families as either members of
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the Czech or German nation, thus forcing many who had not previously considered
themselves to be part of either nation to join one of them.33
From the perspective of the twentieth century, the history of the nineteenth
century in Central and Eastern Europe seems to oﬀer a panoramic view of worsening
relations among neighboring communities that used diﬀerent languages or practiced
diﬀerent religions. What we are seeing, however, is neither the awakening of nations
nor the end of some kind of idyllic existence characterized by an acceptance of diversity
or so-called hybrid identities at the local level. The largely rural communities of East
Central Europe in particular knew nothing of hybridity or multiculturalism because
they knew nothing of modern nations. What they experienced in their everyday lives
was completely normal to them and not exceptional. What was exceptional to them,
however, was the gradual intrusion in their world of outsiders, of civil servants, of
communications and commercial networks, of new media, of political parties. Even
in 1848, when popular politics ﬁrst exploded the cultural fabric of daily life in the
region, the potential for all-consuming nationalist conﬂicts to tear society apart remained only a potential. Activists in 1848 were not the activists of 1900. The former
still deﬁned their world in tangible ways that privileged local interests and interpretations of the world. For this reason, their nationalisms did not necessarily exclude other
nationalisms, and given the legal and social conditions of the day, most envisioned
a society characterized by personal emancipation. By 1900, however, local conditions had changed radically, thanks to the spread of media, the rise of literacy, and a
remarkable political mobilization. So too had the contents of nationalist ideologies.
Local interests were now understood by more people to be intimately connected to
nationalist interests. A broad and abstract concept of nation (whichever version) had
become part of loyalty to the traditions of place, making local conﬂict on nationalist
lines more of a possibility in daily life.
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